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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE "TARTAN TAX" 
by Peter McGregor, Jim Stevens, Kim Swales and Ya Ping Yin* 
Fraser of Allander Institute and International Centre for Macroeconomic Modelling, 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The General Election has resulted in the election of 
a Labour government committed to holding a 
referendum on the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament and on whether the parliament should 
have tax varying powers. The proposed referendum 
will be pre-legislative and will seek popular support 
for proposals set out in a White Paper based upon 
the plans developed by the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC). A recent opinion poll suggests 
that 64% of Scots are in favour of a Scottish 
Parliament with 21% against and 15% undecided. 
(Dinwoodie 1997) In addition, 53% are in favour of 
the proposed "tax raising" powers with 28% against 
and 19% undecided. With a referendum planned 
for early Autumn, a Scottish Parliament with tax 
varying powers seems in prospect before the end of 
the millennium. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the 
economics of the revenue raising powers or "Tartan 
Tax". In the remainder of this paper we will discuss 
mainly the financial aspects of the parliament. In 
Section 2, we set out an analysis of the scope of the 
proposed parliament and consider its likely 
influence on the macro economy. Section 3 briefly 
sets out Scotland's fiscal position whilst Section 4 
outlines the approach to modelling the economy 
adopted in this paper. Section 5 presents both a 
theoretical and empirical evaluation of the probable 
effects of the proposed "tartan tax". Our concluding 
remarks are set out in Section 6. 
2. THE ECONOMIC POWERS OF THE 
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 
Although some of the detail has yet to be fully 
established, inter alia, the SCC scheme envisages 
the following. 
A Scottish Parliament of 129 members is to be 
elected by a variant of the Additional Member 
System (AMS). There will be 73 Scottish 
constituency members elected by First past the post 
and an additional 'top up' 56 members elected from 
lists in the 8 Scottish Euro constituencies. It is 
envisaged that in each Euro seat the 7 additional 
members will top up the 9 constituency members to 
engender the maximum possible degree of 
proportionality. 
If the system had been in place at the 1992 general 
election, it would have resulted in Labour becoming 
the largest party with 51 seats with no overall 
control of the parliament. Curtice (1997) estimates 
that Labour would have fared better in 1997, 
gaining 63 seats on the basis of a 45V£% share of 
the popular vote. This is 2 short of an overall 
majority which Curtice suggests requires around 
47% of the popular vote, distributed as at present. 
In Scotland's four party system, we are likely to 
experience coalition government which may militate 
against any single party being able to implement 
it's preferred economic and fiscal strategy. 
The SCC scheme capitalises on the substantial 
system of administrative devolution presently in 
place in Scotland. The parliament will administer 
the spending programmes currently the remit of the 
Secretary of State for Scotland and will determine 
the disposition of resources between the various 
Scottish office functions (health, education, social 
services, local government, law, order and 
protective services, and the activities of the regional 
development bodies, Highlands & Islands Enterprise 
and Scottish Enterprise). In addition, the parliament 
would determine Scottish legislation making the 
body substantially different from that proposed for 
Wales or Northern Ireland. 
*The authors are grateful to the ESRC and Scottish Enterprise National for funding the development 
of the AMOS model. 
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Functions such as foreign affairs, defence, social 
security, monetary policy, fiscal policy, civil 
aviation, regulation of industry and commerce 
would remain the responsibility of Westminster. 
The exact method of allocating duties between 
Westminster and Edinburgh remains to be 
determined The SCC scheme calls for a set of 
defined powers to be devolved to a Scottish 
parliament whilst the Constitutional Unit proposes 
that the powers to be retained at Westminster be 
specified with the Scottish parliament being 
responsible for everything else. 
Scotland will continue to be represented by 72 
Westminster MPs and continue to have a Scottish 
Secretary of Cabinet rank. There is an ongoing 
debate about the long term political viability of this 
representation and the possible implications for the 
way in which England will be governed in future. 
If the status quo is not an option for Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, then it is not likely to 
be an option for England. 
In this light, devolution should not be viewed as a 
one-off event but rather a process that will 
fundamentally alter the governance of the whole of 
the UK. In the medium term, this could lead to a 
re-appraisal of the basis for allocating public 
expenditure between the nations and regions of the 
UK and weaken Scot's ability to engender 
favourable fiscal outcomes in the Whitehall and 
Westminster system. 
On the arrangements for financing the Scottish 
Parliament, the SCC are unequivocal. The SCC 
publication, Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right 
argues that 
"The principle of equalisation will 
continue. This means resources will be 
pooled on a UK basis and distributed on 
the basis of need. The establishing Act 
will embody the principle of equalisation -
which has provided a stable, long term 
foundation for government expenditure in 
Scotland for many years, receives the 
support of all the UK parties and has 
served Scotland and the UK well. Thus, 
Scotland will continue to be guaranteed 
her fair share of UK resources The 
current formula for the calculation of 
government expenditure in Scotland - the 
Barnett/Goschen Formula - will continue 
to be used as the basis for the allocation of 
Scotland's fair share of UK resources." 
(pp:27) 
The Bamett formula determines the size of the 
Scottish Office block. This formula allocates to 
Scotland a population weighted share of the 
changes in an unknown block of English and Welsh 
spending programmes1. It has the property that it 
should encourage convergence of Scottish per 
capita spending to English and Welsh levels and 
was introduced as a response to Scottish spending 
per head being above the levels set out in the 1976 
needs assessment. The formula has failed to deliver 
the intended convergence. Heald (1992) argues that 
this is due to the rounding up of the population 
weights, declining Scottish population, formula 
bypass by skilful Scottish Secretaries and to various 
adjustments to the way UK spending is accounted 
for. The weights of the formula were changed for 
the first ume in 1992 and now reflect current 
population share and should promote faster 
convergence2. 
The parliament will be financed by an 'assigned 
budget' determined in exactly the same way as the 
Scottish Office funding is currently established. The 
present 'block and formula' arrangements account 
for 95% of total Scottish Office expenditure of 
around £14%bn. The remainder comprises 
expenditure on agriculture and nationalised 
industries which are determined/ negotiated 
separately. Spending in these areas reflects UK 
policies and priorities and the Scottish parliament's 
duty will be to oversee policy delivery of UK 
determined programmes. The nature and extent of 
any borrowing powers remains to be established. 
Subject to popular endorsement in a second 
referendum question, the parliament will have the 
power to vary income tax by ±3p on the standard 
rate. According to Treasury estimates this would 
yield a probable £390m in 1994/95 which is small 
in relation to both the assigned budget and to 
Scottish GDP of around £50bn. This is the only 
direct fiscal instrument to be given to the 
parliament. It will not have the power to engender 
new regional taxes or to vary terms or rates of other 
tax instruments. 
In particular, great stress is placed on the view that 
business taxation will remain under Westminster 
control. However, as Jones (1995) has noted, the 
profits of self employed people are subject to 
income tax. The extent to which elements of 
personal income are exempted will affect the 
potential tax take and it is reported that the Scottish 
Office are seeking ways to exempt the earnings of 
self employed from the tax varying powers. Labour 
intends to return the determination of business rates 
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to local authorities. The parliament will still 
determine the overall spending of local authorities 
and could in principle transfer the burden of 
taxation onto council taxpayers and business by 
retaining a higher proportion of the assigned budget 
for central government services. 
In principle, adherence to a UK policy of 
equalisation is at variance with the tax reduction 
powers proposed by the SCC. A national policy of 
equalisation is pursued to ensure that everyone 
living in every part of the UK receives the same 
access to public services. Given an unequal spread 
of wealth and opportunity in the UK and wide 
differences in population density this implies that a 
different per capita spend will be required in 
different parts of the country and that transfers 
between richer and poorer areas becomes inevitable. 
Thus, one cause of regional public sector deficits is 
the operation of the national policy of equalisation 
which nails down a large proportion of overall 
government expenditure in an area. The bulk of 
Scottish Office spending is allocated via the Bamett 
formula and justified rather nebulously on the basis 
of needs. However, administrative devolution gives 
the Scottish Office and the proposed Parliament the 
power to allocate across spending areas according 
to local preferences. Thus, equalisation is not 
pursued on a service by service basis and there is 
wide variation in per capita spend on various 
services both within Scotland and between Scotland 
and the rest of the UK. 
Even so, the overall level of provision is justified in 
terms of need, and policy conflict will emerge if a 
deficit region wishes to cut regional taxes. The very 
act immediately challenges the nationally 
determined goal of equalisation of public services. 
If the principle of equalisation is to continue, as the 
SCC plan desires, a practical implication is that 
regional tax variation is in some circumstances 
inconsistent with the pursuit of a UK policy of 
equalisation. Although this is the case most relevant 
to our current circumstances, it may not matter 
much in practice but does foreshadow a more 
fundamental concern. 
Heald (1992) maintains that the exact details of 
Bamett Formula remain unknown outside official 
circles and suggests that formula bypass has 
contributed to Scotland receiving bigger increments 
than warranted. If tax variation is to work the block 
funding must be made independent of the tax 
varying powers. One solution would be a 
transparent allocation mechanism accompanied by 
periodic needs assessments to determine the desired 
national allocation of public spending. Our analysis 
of Scotland's fiscal position suggests that this may 
be a painful process because any rational basis for 
allocating public expenditure across the UK may 
lead to real cuts in Scottish Office/Parliament 
budgets. 
The alternative is to rely on Scottish clout in the 
Whitehall system to protect Scottish Office budgets 
using the present and less transparent arrangements. 
This would seem to be what will happen. Initially 
Scottish Secretaries will emerge with an expenditure 
settlement which will comprise the budget of the 
Scottish Parliament With an allocation which 
derives, in part, from political factors and depends 
on a mechanism which is not transparent and whose 
properties can and have been altered, it would not 
be entirely impossible to foresee situations in which 
the Treasury claws back some of the increased 
tartan tax revenue. In such a situation, the 
independence of the revenue varying powers and 
the determination of the scale of the grant depends 
on political decisions. 
Whether the present arrangements are sustainable 
with or without devolution is beyond me scope of 
this paper. However, political arguments as to the 
eventual number of Scottish MP's and the ultimate 
status and influence of the Scottish Secretary would 
appear to make this approach look less sustainable 
in the long run. This is a fundamental policy 
dilemma facing those framing the devolution 
legislation. The question is not whether the basis for 
allocating public expenditure to Scotland will be 
reviewed but when and under what circumstances. 
From the foregoing account, it is evident that the 
Scottish parliament will not exercise substantial 
influence on the level of aggregate demand in 
Scotland. To the extent that stabilisation policy is 
pursued it will be conducted at a UK level. As 
Newlands (1997) notes, the extent to which public 
finance theory can be marshalled to endorse a 
regional parliament resides in the ability of such a 
body to engender a more efficient allocation of 
resources. This is due to the view that the electoral 
process serves as a crude mechanism for revealing 
local, social preferences thus promoting greater 
social welfare through a more optimal allocation of 
Scottish public spending. 
However, the parliament will control many of the 
key levers of supply side policy. Local 
accountability and control may ensure that these 
levers are pulled in a more appropriate way. The 
parliament will be in control of many of the things 
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thought important to national prosperity by 
(endogenous) growth theorists and management 
consultants such as Michael Porter. The extent to 
which the Scottish parliament can shift resources 
into human capital development, economic and 
social infrastructure, technology development and 
transfer is uncertain, as is the long run pay off. 
Short term considerations may preclude a shift from 
public consumption to public investment 
particularly at a time of slow real growth in public 
spending. Supply side policies are long run in 
nature and seek to increase the trend growth rate. 
Funding via a block grant ensures that the benefits 
do not directly accrue to the institution which 
makes the required sacrifices of public consumption 
goods. This may act as a disincentive to shift 
resources into such areas. 
Our discussion suggest that the macroeconomics of 
Scottish devolution revolves around three main 
issues. First, the impact of any change in the use of 
the total UK-determined Scottish budget (block 
grant now and assigned budget under devolution). 
Secondly, the effects of any induced changes in the 
scale of the assigned budget. Thirdly, the impact of 
the proposed independent tax-changing powers. 
We consider the former two impacts in McGregor 
et al (1997c) where we conclude that re-allocation 
of the Scottish Parliament budget, the ability to 
enact legislation and control enterprise agencies 
offers considerable scope for influencing the 
Scottish economy but that this cannot be assumed, 
a priori, to deliver improved performance and 
higher growth rates. However, we note that a 
respectable literature on fiscal federalism supports 
the notion that reallocation of a regional budget can 
improve economic welfare. 
Second, any induced attempts to limit the scale of 
the Scottish budget via cuts in public spending 
would have severe adverse effect on output and 
employment in the Scottish economy. There are 
clearly some pressures towards equalisation of per 
capita expenditures across regions. However, the 
Scottish parliament will surely argue the case on a 
"needs" basis, though the prevailing view is that 
this would still imply longer-run contractions in the 
Scottish share of UK public expenditure. The 
parliament would presumably emphasise the need 
for gradualism in any such adjustmeni, which must 
be effected against the background of a growing 
private sector. 
We note that Scottish independence would require 
adjustment of the Scottish public sector deficit 
(PSD) to a target governed by the need for a 
sustainable Scottish fiscal policy, rather than 
adjustmeni to a share of expenditures. This would 
be likely to be significantly more painful for the 
Scottish economy, ceteris paribus, unless 
independence per se were somehow to stimulate 
private sector activity in an offsetting manner. 
Whatever, conflicts emerge between Scotland and 
London, there is no separatist trap door from which 
to escape the financial realities facing a Scottish 
Parliament. 
3. SCOTLAND' S FISCAL POSITION 
In the UK, taxes and other central government 
revenues are determined centrally, pooled and 
distributed to the nations and regions according to 
the principle of equalisation. Equalisation dictates 
that the same level of public services be available 
to citizens, irrespective of where they live. This 
implies that providing the same level of service in 
a poorer and less densely populated area may 
require a greater than average per capita spend and 
result in a fiscal deficit which requires to be 
financed by other parts of the UK. In assessing the 
Scottish fiscal position, the appropriate definition of 
government spending is the cost of providing the 
level of services enjoyed by the Scottish people. 
Scottish revenue is due to incomes of Scots 
residents, consumer spending in Scottish outlets and 
the activities of business establishments based in 
Scotland. 
Scotland's expenditure and revenue is not 
separately identified in the UK public accounts and 
has to be estimated, a process which is judgemental 
to a degree. The most widely agreed means of 
doing this are set out in Mackay and Woods 
(1992), Stevens (1995) and Scottish Office (1995 
and 1996) which provide estimates of Scotland's 
fiscal position for the 1990/91 to 1994/95 period. 
Spending has three elements as set out in Table 1 
for 1994/95. 
Identifiable Spending ( Scottish Office + Social 
Security) 
Unidentifiable Spending (largely public goods such 
as defence, foreign affairs etc ) 
Other Spending (servicing of debt, National 
Accounting Adjustments) 
Identifiable spending in Scotland is available from 
a Treasury Territorial Expenditure Exercise 
published annually in the Annexe to the Public 
Expenditure Statement Unidentifiable spending 
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and much of Other Spending requires to be 
allocated to Scotland according to either a 
population share or GDP share basis. On the 
revenue side, the UK operates a unified tax system 
which does not allow regional revenue to be 
separately identified. In the case of income tax, the 
Inland Revenue undertakes a sample of tax returns 
which allows Scottish revenue to be estimated. For 
other taxes a variety of estimators based on 
economic, industry and population measures are 
utilised. 
Scottish Office (1996) indicates that, in 1994/95, 
expenditure on services enjoyed by the Scottish 
people totalled £29.7bn whilst Scottish revenue 
amounted to £23%bn with and £22.1bn without 
North Sea Oil Revenue with die difference being 
funded by transfers from Rest of UK taxpayers. 
Scottish public expenditure accounts for 10V4% of 
UK spending whilst Scottish revenue accounts for 
8.9% of the national equivalent. The size of the 
Scottish budget deficit depends largely on the UK 
budget deficit which fluctuates with the economic 
cycle. Stevens (1997) reviews the substantial body 
of evidence which indicates that Scotland possesses 
a substantial structural deficit. A structural deficit 
arises when an area's share of national public 
expenditure is greater than an area's share of 
national government revenue. If the national 
accounts are in balance and Scotland accounted for 
the same shares of UK revenue and expenditure as 
in 1994/95, then Scotland would have a budget 
deficit equivalent to 1.35% of UK public 
expenditure/revenue. 
All of the published estimates indicate that 
Scotland's expenditure share is higher than its 
revenue share. In addition, Table 2 presents recent 
evidence supplied by the Treasury in response to 
Parliamentary Questions relating to the 1979/80 to 
1994/95 period. Column 1 sets out official measures 
of the UK General Government Borrowing 
Requirement (GGBR) excluding privatisation 
proceeds and North Sea oil revenues. A positive 
number indicates a deficit and a negative number a 
surplus. Treasury estimates of Scotland' s share of 
the UK GGBR (excluding privatisation proceeds 
and oil revenues) are presented in the second 
column of Table 2 and used to derive the Scottish 
GGBR set out in the third column. For the years 
where the UK was in surplus, the Scottish deficit is 
estimated by taking 10.25% of UK spending and 
the population share of UK revenue. Column 4 
contains estimates of the Scottish GGBR and is 
obtained by adding back population share of UK 
privatisation proceeds and 90% of UK North Sea 
oil revenues. 
This evidence is consistent with this view that 
Scotland experiences a structural deficit First, 
Scotland's share of the UK deficit (excluding 
privatisation proceeds and North Sea Oil Revenue) 
is above it's share of the UK population in every 
year. Second, Scotland's share of the UK deficit 
increases substantially as the UK moves into fiscal 
surplus in the late 1980s. Table 2 indicates that for 
much of the 1980s, Scotland would have been in 
surplus if she received 90% of UK North Sea 
receipts and population share of UK privatisation 
proceeds but that in the 1990's and Scotland would 
be in deficit on this basis. Forecasts of Scotland's 
fiscal position based on the structural deficit result 
are contained in Stevens (1997) and Woods (1997). 
Table 3 indicates that total Scottish public spending 
per head is higher in Scotland than in most other 
parts of the UK. This is particularly the case for 
the areas which will be controlled by the Scottish 
parliament. The UK operates a system of 
equalisation which results in transfers from richer to 
poorer areas, and it is possible to argue that the 
higher per capita expenditure in Scotland is 
justified by greater needs. In some cases greater 
spending is required in Scotland in order to ensure 
an equal provision of services given its more 
spatially dispersed population. Reference is also 
made to higher Scottish unemployment, greater 
levels of poverty, and poorer health statistics, again 
reinforcing the needs-based case for higher public 
expenditure north of the border. 
In addition, there is a suggestion that in terms of 
some criteria the conventional allocation of 
expenditures to Scotland overstates its true share. 
Many of the services enjoyed by the Scottish people 
are provided from outwith Scotland. For example, 
Scotland is allocated its population share of UK 
defence spending on the basis that the service is 
provided equally to everyone in the UK. However, 
the South East and South West is heavily over 
represented in the supply of such services and 
benefits disproportionately from the multiplier 
effects of the first round of such spending. 
The last needs assessment was conducted with 
reference to 1976 and indicated that spending per 
head across a range of services within the Scottish 
Office block required to be 116% of corresponding 
English levels. It seems unlikely that the current 
levels of expenditure could be justified by a rational 
assessment of Scottish needs. In the case of 
economic indicators, Scotland's relative position 
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compares favourably with the situation pertaining in 
the mid 1970's. However, economic blessings are 
extremely unequally distributed across Scotland 
with Lothian, Grampian and Tayside well above the 
UK average on many criteria and other areas well 
below the average. 
The view that Scodand's per capita expenditure 
cannot be justified by objective needs was 
enunciated forcefully in the dying days of the recent 
General Election by outgoing Scottish Secretary, 
Michael Forsyth, who claimed that unpublished 
official estimates indicated that Scottish Office 
expenditure was £2.5bn above assessed needs. A 
similar view informs reports by the Constitutional 
Unit (1996) and IPPR (1996) but is hotly contested 
by many Scottish politicians, at least in public. 
Ultimately, as Midwinter (1991) has pointed out, an 
assessment of needs is a subjective decision made 
on the basis of objective data. In other words, the 
establishment of need is ultimately a political 
judgement. The 1976 exercise has been severely 
criticised and a new framework for establishing 
needs is warranted. The objective factors chosen 
will have a bearing on the result as would any 
consideration of the spatial distribution of MIRAS 
and the location of public service provision. Thus, 
the official assessments trailed by Michael Forsyth 
may or may not be acceptable to a Labour 
Treasury. However, we repeat that the prevailing 
view is that we would be hard pressed to justify our 
present level of spend with reference to any rational 
computation of 'needs'. 
In this section, we have sought to establish that, 
with or without North Sea oil, a Scottish Parliament 
will spend more per head on identifiable services 
than in the UK and Scotland will receive a transfer 
to support the provision of all public services 
enjoyed by Scots. Scots are provided with a 
significantly higher expenditure per capita on public 
services than south of the border, and this may be 
difficult to justify on the basis of a needs 
assessment. These facts constrain the choices of 
funding a Scottish Parliament and, in particular, 
suggest that it is unlikely that a Scottish Parliament 
could use its tax-varying powers to reduce the 
standard rate of income tax in Scotland. 
4. MODELLING THE SCOTTISH 
ECONOMY 
Any assessment of the macroeconomic impact of 
the Tartan Tax on the Scottish economy will 
depend on the underlying vision of markets and the 
degree of spatial integration between the regions 
and nations which comprise the UK. We therefore 
begin with a brief discussion of the main alternative 
perspectives on regional economies. 
In a UK context, the traditional and broadly 
Keynesian view of regions embodies intuitive 
notions of imperfectly competitive, non-clearing 
markets characterised by limited spatial integration 
which results in moderate migration responses. This 
approach is often augmented with the idea of 
increasing returns to scale and the possibility of 
cumulative causation and persistent (and widening) 
disequilibria. (See eg Armstrong and Taylor, 1993, 
for a discussion.) 
At the other end of the spectrum is a neoclassical 
perspective, held by many US regional economists, 
which is founded upon universal competition and 
rapid labour market adjustment through migration 
flows, so that regions are characterised as being in 
virtual continuous spatial competitive equilibrium 
(eg Schacter and Althaus, 1989). 
We believe that the evidence provides little support 
for the more extreme forms of these alternative 
visions. The idea of continuous spatial general 
equilibrium seems to us obviously inapplicable in 
the UK and probably also in the US context 
(Harrigan and McGregor, 1993). Moreover, the 
traditional Keynesian view, in which markets play 
little or no role, now seems rather naive and also 
lacks supporting evidence. However, some modern 
approaches combine elements of the earlier 
perspectives in a way which makes rejection on the 
basis of available evidence more problematic. 
For example, Minford et al (1994) modify the 
neoclassical view by allowing for labour immobility 
among the unskilled. Krugman (1990) includes 
imperfectly competitive commodity markets and 
increasing returns to scale in a neoclassical model 
of two regions which does not (at least on 
Krugman's interpretation) yield the radical policy 
implications associated with the earlier (informal) 
Keynesian models with similar characteristics. 
However, this set-up seems immediately applicable 
only to the industrialisation phase of regional 
development. Porter's (1990) emphasis on industrial 
"clusters", which has been influential in the 
thinking of Scottish Enterprise National (SEN), also 
echoes aspects of earlier increasing returns models, 
although here the emphasis is on product 
heterogeneity and innovation in a sectorally 
disaggregated context. 
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Our own position is heavily influenced by the 
imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model that 
has become increasingly dominant in UK 
macroeconomic analysis (Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman, 1991). This retains the emphasis on 
markets associated with the neoclassical perspective, 
but the presence of imperfect competition in the 
labour market implies the existence of involuntary 
unemployment. Although at the national level this 
approach incorporates imperfectly competitive 
commodity markets (and could include increasing 
returns), we simplify here by assuming perfectly 
competitive regional commodity markets. No radical 
changes would necessarily result to our conclusions 
from imperfectly competitive commodity markets 
per se. 
We further assume, for simplicity, that Scotland can 
be approximated by a small open region model in 
which Scottish activity in has no influence on prices 
and quantities in external markets. Since Scotland 
accounts for less than 9% of UK GDP, this may be 
a reasonable first approximation, and one which 
allows us to avoid use of a complete interregional 
framework. Interest rates are likewise assumed to 
be exogenous to Scotland which is regarded as a 
price-taker in UK financial markets. 
Our preferred view of the regional economy is 
embedded in the structure of AMOS which is a 
computable general equilibrium framework 
calibrated to capture the key features of the Scottish 
economy. AMOS is not a forecasting model but is 
used to conduct simulation of a wide range of 
policies and is designed to capture the 
economy/system wide ramifications of policy 
options. The approach is to start with the Scottish 
economy in equilibrium and to conduct a policy 
change such as raising Scottish income tax by 3p. 
The model works out the effects of the policy on all 
parts of the Scottish economy and compares the 
properties of the new equilibrium with the previous 
situation. The model answers questions concerning 
the impact of policy on a wide range of variables 
such as migration, employment, unemployment, 
earnings, inflation and GDP. 
A brief description of AMOS is presented here with 
a fuller account available in Harrigan ei al (1991). 
AMOS is a simplified model with only 4 types of 
transactor and 3 types of commodities produced by 
3 types of industry. The transactors comprise 
households, the non household personal sector, 
corporations and government These transactors 
trade and consume the commodities produced by 
manufacturing industry, a non-manufacturing 
traded sector and a sheltered sector whose goods 
and services may provide inputs to traded goods but 
which are largely not directly traded outwith 
Scotland. 
There are 4 major components of final demand: 
consumption, investment, government expenditure 
and exports. Consumption depends on real 
disposable income. Real government expenditure is 
equal to the base year level plus an additional 
amount corresponding to the revenues raised by the 
Tartan Tax. This results in government spending 
becoming dependent on the entire general 
equilibrium of the system which is exactly what 
would happen if the Tartan Tax were implemented. 
Exports and imports are determined via an 
Armington link (Armington (1969)) which has the 
effect of making Scottish trade flows sensitive to 
relative (to the rest of the UK and the rest of the 
world) prices. 
The treatment of investment is a little more 
complex in that the model can be run to produce 
either period by period short run equilibria or a 
single long run equilibrium. The difference relates 
to the assumptions concerning the capital stock and 
investment. In the period by period simulations, 
both the total and sectoral composition of the 
regional capital stock is fixed in each period. Each 
sector's capital stock is updated according to a 
simple capital stock adjustment process in which 
investment in each period equals depreciation plus 
some fraction of the gap between the actual and the 
desired capital stock. Desired capital stocks are 
those which minimise the cost of production and 
actual stocks reflect last period's stocks adjusted for 
depreciation and gross investment. 
In long run equilibrium, desired and actual capital 
stocks must correspond. Accordingly, in long run 
simulations, the capital stock is determined inside 
the system and again dependent on cost 
minimisation criteria. In long run equilibrium, 
investment is equal to depreciation of the optimal 
capital stock. 
Population is likewise endogenous and is updated in 
period by period simulations in a similar way to the 
capital stock. Our approach is based on Layard ex al 
(1991) which sees migration persisting until 
disparities between regional and UK real wage rates 
and unemployment are eliminated. In long run 
equilibrium there is zero net migration. 
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5. T H E M A C R O E C O N O M I C 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE "TARTAN 
TAX" 
Much of the debate over the economics of 
devolution has focussed on the likely impact of the 
"tartan tax", so we consider this issue in some 
depth. We have seen that, if imposed at the 
maximum rate, this is estimated to generate some 
£390m of additional revenues that will be used to 
increase public sector expenditures in Scotland. We 
are therefore concerned here with the likely impact 
of a balanced budget fiscal expansion, which on 
impact would increase both tax revenues and 
government expenditures by some £390m. Recall 
that the total assigned budget is likely to be around 
£14% billion. The "tartan tax" is therefore 
comparatively "small beer". However, it is 
important as the only source of additional revenue 
which is, in principle, completely at the discretion 
of the Scottish Parliament. 
We simplify the analysis in a number of respects, 
although we do return to consider the possible 
implications of these simplifications. We consider 
that the only real choice for the Scottish Parliament, 
given the structural public sector deficit, is whether 
to increase the standard rate by 3p. We further 
assume that the assigned budget is not cut as the 
tax is levied, so that the revenues from the "tartan 
tax" are genuinely additional to the budget of the 
Scottish Parliament, and that the increment to 
government expenditures does not directly stimulate 
the supply-side. We begin with a non-technical 
discussion of likely effects and then provide a 
summary of available empirical evidence . 
(a) Long run theory of a balanced-budget 
fiscal expansion of in a regional 
economy 
A comprehensive analysis of the impact of the 
balanced-budget fiscal expansion involves three 
main considerations. First, there is the aggregate 
demand effect of the expansion, abstracting from 
any knock-on price and wage effects. This is the 
subject of basic textbook treatments of the 
"balanced budget multiplier". Secondly, there are 
the supply effects that are induced by the aggregate 
demand stimulus, reflecting the extent to which 
capacity and labour supply constraints tend to limit 
the expansionary output effects of this change and 
stimulate price rises instead. Thirdly, there is the 
independent supply effect which reflects any impact 
of the tax hike on the wage bargaining process. 
Specifically, this third effect relates to employees' 
reaction to the reduction in the take home pay 
caused by the tax increase. We consider each of 
these effects in turn. 
The basic idea underlying the aggregate demand 
effect is that the increased government expenditure 
stimulates demand directly, whereas the increase in 
taxes has its impact effect on disposable income. 
Consumption falls by less than disposable income, 
given a positive propensity to save, and so 
aggregate demand increases. However, the theory of 
consumption and aggregate demand on which this 
model is based is very simple. In more 
sophisticated settings a number of objections can be 
raised. Thus, traditional macroeconomic analysis 
emphasises the likely rise in interest rates and 
consequent "crowding out" effect on private sector 
expenditures, notably investment. Since, as noted 
above, a region such as Scotland can be regarded as 
a "price-taker" in integrated financial markets, as a 
first approximation, this is not a major concern for 
our analysis . 
In the long run, a permanent increase in government 
expenditure and taxation is argued to reduce wealth 
and lead to an offsetting reduction in consumption. 
However, the conditions required for this to be 
exactly offsetting are not plausible. In any case, in 
Scotland, government expenditure is less import-
intensive than consumption, so that even a direct 
replacement of consumption by an equal amount of 
government expenditure would stimulate the 
demand for domestically produced goods. (See eg 
Oates (1972) for further discussion5.) 
In simple accounts, this aggregate demand stimulus 
induces a corresponding extension of aggregate 
supply with no rises in prices. However, matters are 
likely to be more complex in practice. In the short-
run the fixed nature of capital stocks and the 
limited availability of labour constitute resource 
constraints on the regional economy. These 
constraints imply that aggregate supply over such 
periods would not be extended without some 
increase in prices , although during recessions 
excess capacity is likely to create an output range 
over which prices respond very little to demand 
stimuli. 
However, over the long-run the supply of both 
labour and capital in the region increases, through 
in-migration and investment respectively. Given a 
small, open region like Scotland, this increase in 
labour and capital is likely to result in a much 
bigger induced supply response in the long-run.1 
Note that, while the induced supply response may 
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moderate the real output effects of the boost to 
demand, the overall effect remains expansionary. 
Once we take account of the impact effects of the 
tax on wage bargaining, however, a contraction in 
output and employment becomes possible. The 
direct effect of the tax change on the supply side, 
which is quite independent of the other effects, has 
a potentially contractionary impact. The introduction 
of the "tartan tax" reduces the after-tax real 
consumption wage of Scottish workers. If they 
respond by seeking to restore their take-home pay 
through upward pressure on the (gross) wage paid 
by firms this introduces an adverse supply shock: 
the cost of labour to firms increases and they, in 
turn, are compelled to raise prices at any given 
level of output As a consequence there will be a 
decline in Scottish competitiveness which would 
tend to reduce the demand for Scottish exports and 
increase Scottish demand for imports. 
To provide a complete analysis of such "tax-
shifting" effects we first consider the factors which 
govern its extent and then assess its likely 
macroeconomic impact. An important influence on 
tax-shifting is the nature of the wage bargaining 
system. The simplest case is where wage bargaining 
is conducted at the national level, with the nominal 
wage effectively being exogenous to a small, open 
region such as Scotland. If the national bargaining 
system survived the introduction of differential 
income tax rates, the implication is that there would 
be no upward pressure on the nominal wage and so 
no adverse supply shift. In this case then the "tartan 
tax" would stimulate output and employment in the 
Scottish economy through the expansion in 
aggregate demand. 
Much recent literature argues, however, that wage 
bargaining is regionally-based (eg Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1994; Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991), 
and here the factors governing the degree of tax-
shifting are a little more complex. The two key 
influences are the degree to which workers value 
the increased government expenditures that the 
levying of the "tartan tax" makes possible, and the 
extent to which this valuation is then reflected in 
the wage bargaining process. 
For example, one possibility is that workers feel no 
worse off after the introduction of the tax relative 
to the position prior to the change. Here the loss of 
disposable income at the margin is just 
compensated for by the increased amenity generated 
by the higher government expenditure made 
possible by the "tartan tax" revenues. If, in addition, 
workers allowed this feeling of being "no worse 
off to be fully reflected in their wage bargaining 
behaviour, so that they do not push for even partial 
compensation of the loss of disposable income 
generated by the tax, then there would again be no 
adverse independent supply-side effect 
What would be the likely overall effects of the 
"tartan tax" in these circumstances? We know that 
there is a stimulus to aggregate demand and if 
amenity effects fully compensate for disposable 
income loss, then there is no adverse impact effect 
on aggregate supply. In these circumstances the 
"tartan tax" would be good news for Scottish output 
and employment in the long-run since only the 
aggregate demand stimulus would be present in this 
case, and given a very responsive supply side in the 
long-run, the demand stimulus would ultimately 
have little impact on prices and wages, but would 
have a major impact on output and employment 
More generally, if there is regional bargaining and 
workers do not value the amenity effect of 
increased expenditures as much as their loss of 
take-home pay, and/or if workers simply do not 
moderate their wage claims by the full value of the 
increased amenity, there will be some upward 
pressure on nominal wages. This tax-shifting into 
higher wages (which is additional to any effect 
induced by the demand stimulus) also impacts on 
prices, and the resultant loss of Scottish 
competitiveness leads to a contraction our exports 
and a substitution away from domestic goods in 
favour of imports. This supply-side impact is 
therefore unambiguously contractionary. 
Overall, however, the net effect of the "tartan tax" 
on output and employment is ambiguous here and 
depends on whether the expansionary demand effect 
outweighs the contractionary supply effect of the 
"tartan lax". Our policy simulations presented below 
suggest that if Scottish workers were all to succeed 
in fully compensating themselves for the loss of 
take-home pay through pushing up their gross wage 
(an outcome we consider very unlikely), then the 
adverse supply side effect would in fact 
predominate, and output and employment would 
contract. 
(b) Empirical and Simulation evidence 
To determine the likely empirical effects of the 
"tartan tax" we have to assess the likely scale of 
both the stimulus to the demand side and the wage 
push/ tax-shifting supply side effect, and estimate 
their likely impact on the Scottish economy. As 
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argued above, this requires a knowledge of the 
operation of the entire Scottish economy8. However, 
our model of the Scottish economy (AMOS) 
contains all the information required to conduct 
such an analysis, with the important exception of 
the extent to which, under regional bargaining, the 
"tartan tax" will be shifted forward. Determining 
the size of this adverse supply disturbance is 
especially difficult since we have no experience of 
spatially differentiated income tax rates in the UK, 
and therefore no basis for econometric investigation 
of its effect on wage bargaining and migration in 
particular9. 
We do have two types of evidence that may be 
relevant, relating to both the effects of income taxes 
on national demand and supply sides and the 
effects of "local" income taxes in fiscal federalist 
economies where they have been long-established. 
However, the evidence is not compelling in either 
case. First, the impact of income tax rate changes 
on national bargaining remains controversial, with 
conflicting evidence ranging from full "tax-shifting" 
on to wages to none at all (in which case there is 
no impact effect of the tax on the supply side). (See 
eg Church et al, 1993, and Knoester and van der 
Windt, 1987.) In any case, given that in a regional 
context workers may avoid the tax through 
migration, the relevance of the national evidence is 
questionable. 
Secondly, while evidence on the key effects of 
fiscal federalism is comparatively limited, it seems 
that regional public expenditures can at least 
partially offset the negative impact of taxes on 
migration (Day (1992)); regional balanced budget 
fiscal expansions can stimulate growth (at least if 
expenditures are not simply redistributional) (Helms 
(1985)); and regional income taxes are not fully 
shifted forward into wages (Wallace, 1993). 
However, the evidence is not nearly strong enough 
to allow any firm parameterisation of the likely 
impact of spatially differentiated income taxes on 
the supply side. 
Because of the uncertainty about supply effects in 
particular, we simulate the impact of the 
introduction of the "tartan tax" under alternative 
assumptions. We report the estimated long-run 
impact on GDP, aggregate employment and the 
unemployment rate for two alternative assumptions 
about aggregate supply. If there is Scottish-specific 
bargaining in the labour market and if all workers 
secure full compensation for the reduction in take 
home pay by pushing up their gross wages, then we 
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estimate that GDP would fall by some 1.2% in the 
long-run, after all migration and investment 
adjustments are complete. Total employment is 
expected to fall by 1.33% (as is the numbers of 
unemployed), but the unemployment rate is 
ultimately unaffected10. 
We do not believe, however, that this case has 
much practical significance. Many workers are 
currently paid in accordance with national pay 
awards (notably in the public sector), and a modest 
differential income tax may not affect this. Thus 
employees in multi-plant, multi-region firms would 
seem unlikely to be compensated for the local tax 
rise (or any induced rise in prices). Furthermore, 
those who are geographically immobile or who are 
members of weak unions may be unable to force 
compensation following the introduction of the 
"tartan tax". Finally, there are likely to be some 
who feel as well off after the tax as before, or who 
at least do not feel worse off by the full amount of 
the fall in take home pay (because of their valuation 
of the amenity associated with the increased 
expenditures), and who reflect this in their wage 
aspirations. 
If all workers were subject to national bargaining, 
the long-run results would GDP and employment 
actually rise, by 0.45% and 0.42% respectively; the 
unemployment rate falls by 0.72%n. If bargaining 
is in fact Scottish-specific, but workers value the 
amenity effect of the expenditures just as much as 
the loss of take home pay, then nominal wages do 
not rise because of "tax-shifting", and the results 
are consequently very similar to the national 
bargaining case . Of course, as we have already 
emphasised, this is a very special case and, more 
generally, there is likely to be some upward 
pressure on wages, but not to the extent implied by 
the "full compensation" case reported above. 
Employment effects prove to be very sensitive to 
the degree of tax-shifting and it transpires that if, in 
aggregate, over 30% of the reduction in the take-
home wage is compensated for by tax-shifting, then 
the overall macroeconomic effect of the "tartan tax" 
is likely to be contractionary. 
(c ) Some extensions to the basic analysis 
Both our meoretical discussion and empirical results 
are predicated upon a number of simplifying 
assumptions, so we now briefly consider the likely 
impact of relaxing a number of these. 
While we have assumed that the "tartan tax" 
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revenues will be additional to the assigned budget, 
the possibility of the UK Treasury ultimately 
reducing the assigned budget in an offsetting 
fashion is worthy of note. Of course, if this were to 
happen the beneficial demand effect of the 
increased expenditures would be neutralised by the 
reduction in the assigned budget, so that the overall 
impact of the "tartan tax" would inevitably be 
contractionary. A Scottish Parliament would, of 
course, not knowingly introduce the "tartan tax" in 
such circumstances, but the worry is that in the 
long-run, especially given the presence of a 
"hostile" government in power in Westminster, this 
outcome cannot be entirely discounted. 
Clearly the effects of the "tartan tax" must depend 
to some degree on the use to which the increment 
to revenues is put. In our discussion and model 
simulations we have assumed that it simply has the 
same composition as existing (non-social-security) 
expenditures, and we have not allowed for any 
direct supply-side effects of these expenditures, 
such as are argued to attend improvements in 
infrastructure (and in an endogenous growth 
context, investment in human capital). This is likely 
to be important in practice, though our approach 
reflects the absence of any indication about the 
likely use of the additional tax revenues. 
It would probably be inadvisable, at least from the 
perspective of effects on the aggregate economy, to 
use the revenues to attempt to affect income 
redistribution. What evidence there is suggests that 
this is unlikely to have beneficial effects on 
regional growth or attract in-migration/ limit out-
migration. However, this is not an argument against 
redistribution per se, rather it is an argument in 
support of the traditional public finance view that 
any income redistribution is best undertaken at the 
level of the nation as a whole. 
In practice, we know that some workers are 
governed by national wage agreements while others 
are more obviously subject to "local" labour market 
influences, and this particular source of 
heterogeneity would appear to rule out the "worst 
case" result identified above. However, there is also 
quite a bit of evidence to suggest that, in the UK at 
least, migration is selective in age and skill. 
Allowance for this in our analysis would be likely 
to reinforce the results obtained above, improving 
the "good news" cases (characterised by in-
migration) and causing any "bad news" (out-
migration) to get worse. 
Allowance for differential skills also leads naturally 
to consideration of the probable effects of allowing 
for differential household incomes. In a progressive 
tax-expenditure system a hiking of "local" income 
tax rates may be thought to encourage out-migration 
of higher income households and in-migration of 
poorer households, especially if expenditures are 
targeted on the latter. However, it is entirely 
possible that some expenditures, for example, on 
education, would be more highly valued by the 
better off, and it is also worth recalling that the 
"tartan tax" proposals imply that higher rates of 
income tax would be unaffected. The evidence from 
existing fiscal-federalist states is not clear cut on 
the presence of any adverse migration shifts of this 
kind13 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We conclude with a brief summary of our overall 
analysis of economics of the tartan tax. First, we 
argue that, as the majority of commentators believe, 
Scotland has, for some time, experienced a 
"structural" public sector deficit ie a deficit that 
would remain even if the Scottish economy operates 
at full capacity utilisation. This conditions our 
analysis in a number of respects, in particular in our 
treatment of the "tartan tax" as an essentially one-
way option. 
However, this analysis should remind everyone in 
Scottish public life that, inside or outside the UK, 
there is not a pot of gold to throw at Scotland's 
economic and social problems. Constitutional 
change does not result in one extra penny to spend 
on Scottish public services and support for 
individuals and businesses. Indeed, under certain 
circumstances, the creation of either a devolved or 
separate Scottish parliament may reduce the level of 
public services below that which might otherwise 
have emerged. 
Adjustment of the total budget through the use of 
the "tartan tax" does not, contrary to some claims, 
inevitably imply the loss of output, employment and 
population in Scotland. If the Scottish people 
genuinely wish increased government expenditure in 
Scotland and, importantly, if they are prepared to 
pay for this in the form of higher income taxes 
without seeking compensating changes in their 
gross wage, then the fiscal innovation of the "tartan 
tax" may have significant beneficial effects on 
employment, output and migration. However, even 
in the worst likely scenario the adverse 
macroeconomic impact is relatively small and 
spread over a considerable time period. 
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If the Scottish people do not wish higher public 
expenditures, or if they are not prepared to pay for 
them through lower take-home pay, then this should 
be reflected in the outcome of the referendum on 
tax-varying powers. Ultimately, if the power to 
raise income taxes is given to the Scottish 
Parliament, some future Scottish government will be 
elected on a mandate of tax-funded higher spending. 
Voters should not vote for the "tartan tax" if they 
do not wish increased expenditures financed out of 
their income taxes. However, voters should not vote 
against the Tartan Tax in the belief that such 
expenditure would inevitably damage Scottish living 
standards and prosperity. 
If there is a "yes" vote on the tax-varying power in 
this context, it would imply expected positive 
macroeconomic effects from its use, since it would 
otherwise be irrational to vote for it. However, it is 
conceivable that some may vote for the tax 
anticipating both higher government expenditures 
and compensated take-home pay, in the knowledge 
that others (lower skilled, immobile, and those in 
weaker unions) are likely to suffer any adverse 
effects. In addition, there will be many voters who 
do not pay income tax. It would be instructive if 
future opinion polls broke down attitudes towards 
the Tartan Tax according to whether respondents 
were or were not income tax payers and attempted 
to ascertain whether supporters regard the tax as a 
free lunch for them at the expense of others. 
It is probably best for supporters of the tax to give 
up suggesting that the tax power is unlikely to be 
used and to take the argument head on. However, it 
is sensible to argue that early use will be resisted. 
Survey evidence suggests that British and Scottish 
people are prepared to pay higher taxation for 
improved public services but are less prepared to 
vote in administrations committed to such policies. 
This may reflect a public perception that the 
increased taxes may not be spent appropriately. In 
short, British and Scottish people may want to pay 
more for greater services but don't trust politicians 
to deliver. 
If this is the case then an appropriate strategy may 
be statutorily to rule out use of the tax varying 
powers in the first term of the new parliament. This 
would allow the Scottish parliamentarian's time to 
demonstrate credibility in administering the 
considerable resources secured via the assigned 
budget. In addition, such a hiatus would allow a full 
discussion amongst employers and employees of the 
damaging effects of 'tax shifting behaviour'. In 
many ways the Tartan Tax is like the social 
contract pursued by the Callaghan government If it 
is to be successful then the trade off between a 
higher social wage and a lower private wage must 
be fully explained and digested. 
Overall, our review of Scottish devolution set down 
here and elsewhere does not lead us believe that the 
macroeconomic case either for or against devolution 
per se is compelling. While devolution undoubtedly 
does provide opportunities for influencing the 
Scottish economy, possibly significandy, die scale 
and even direction of effects depends on the 
particular combination of policies pursued by the 
Scottish Parliament and on the reactions of the 
Scottish people to them. There are no magic wands 
to wave at Scodand's problems and no inevitable 
panaceas due to constitutional change. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. The formula is named after Joel Bametl, a former Labour Chief Secretary to the Treasury. The formula was 
until recently based on 1976 population figures which allocated Scotland £10 and Wales £5 for every £85 change 
in expenditure on comparable English programmes. This meant Scotland receiving 11.6% and Wales 5.88% of 
any change in English expenditure. (See Bell et al (1996), Heald (1992).) 
2.Michael Portillo, who was Chief Secretary to the Treasury in 1992, cut Scotland' s share to 10.66% of changes 
in comparable English expenditure and 10.06% of changes in combined English and Welsh programmes such 
as Law and Order. 
3.The analysis of this section draws liberally on McGregor et al (1997b), which provides a more formal 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the issues. 
4.1t is true, however, that the post-tax interest rate received by Scots will fall, and this could inhibit Scottish 
saving, but we regard this as a second order effect and abstract from it in what follows. (It would in any case 
tend to reinforce the demand stimulus.) 
5.1t has been suggested that some types of government expenditure substitute directly for private sector 
expenditures (eg education, health, subsidized leisure facilities), so that an increase in government expenditure 
will result in an immediate, partially-offsetting contraction in consumption. However, there is little evidence of 
such an effect in the UK and we again abstract from it. 
6.More formally, even if there is no source of nominal inertia in the system, so that workers bargain for real 
wages for example, the regional aggregate supply curve will be non-vertical. This is because of the wedge 
between the real consumption wage, which governs wage-setting, and the real product wage, which is relevant 
to labour demand. As domestic prices increase nominal wages need to increase less than proportionately to 
restore the reals consumption wage given the presence of imported goods in households' consumption bundle. 
7.Any persistent barrier to labour mobility or to investment will result in a non-horizontal AS curve. 
8.For example, recall that the "supply side" depends on: labour supply (or wage-setting by unions); labour 
demand and the aggregate production function. In fact, the simple one good model, by abstracting from the 
presence of a substantial "sheltered" (comparatively non-traded sector) considerably understates the complexity. 
9.The impact on aggregate demand is more straightforward in that it is governed by the relationships already 
embodied in the model, including the relative import intensity of government as against consumption 
expenditures. 
lO.This reflects the absence of any nominal inertia in the system combined with the fact that migration continues 
for as long as Scottish wage and unemployment rates differ from their corresponding values in the rest-of-the 
UK. 
11.Since national bargaining implies that the region is a nominal-wage-taker, the region is characterized by the 
presence of nominal inertia in this case, and the unemployment rate is affected in this case. 
12.The main difference is that the unemployment rate returns to its original value in this case: there is no 
nominal inertia here. 
13.McGregor et al (1997b) also discuss: short-run adjustment paths to the long-run equilibria considered in the 
text; the sensitivity of results to changes in the values of important parameters in the AMOS model. 
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Table 1 
Scotland's Fiscal Position in 1994/95 
(excluding privatisation proceeds) 
£bn 
Identifiable Expenditure 
Non Identifiable Expenditure 
Other Expenditure 
total 
Source: Scottish Office (1996) 
% UK total1! 
23.1 
3.3 
3.9 
30.3 
10.5 
8.5 
10.9 
10.2 
Table 2 
Scotland's 
1979-1995 
79/80 
80/81 
81/82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
92/93 
93/94 
94/95 
total 
Source: St< 
Fiscal Position 
UK GGBR (ex 
Oil & 
Privatisation 
Proceeds) 
£bn 
13.2 
17.5 
13.5 
15.9 
19.8 
23.3 
20.9 
14.1 
7.8 
-1.5 
0.0 
7.1 
22.8 
47.3 
53.5 
45.8 
svens (1997) 
Scotland's 
share (%) 
15.0 
17.0 
12.0 
17.0 
15.0 
13.0 
14.0 
21.0 
50.0 
0.0 
0.0 
57.0 
22.0 
17.0 
17.0 
17.0 
Scottish 
GGBR (ex Oil 
Revenues 
and 
Privatrisation 
Proceeds) 
£bn 
2.0 
3.0 
1.6 
2.7 
3.0 
3.0 
2.9 
3.0 
3.9 
1.1 
2.0 
4.0 
5.0 
8.0 
9.1 
7.8 
Scottish 
GGBR (inc 
Privatisation 
Proceeds and 
Oil 
Revenues) 
£bn 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-2.5 
-2.2 
-5.0 
-8.0 
-7.5 
-1.7 
-0.7 
-2.3 
-0.5 
1.5 
3.4 
6.1 
7.5 
5.8 
-6.5 
Scottish 
GGBR (inc 
Privatisatio 
n Proceeds;: 
and Oil 
Revenues)i! 
1996/97 
prices £bn 
-0.6 
-0.9 
-5.0 
-4.2 
-9.1 
-13.6 
-12.2 
-2.8 
-1.1 
-3.2 
-0.6 
1.9 
3.9 
6.8 
8.0 
6.1 
-26.0 
Table 3 
Scotland: 1994/95 
Identifiable General Government Expenditure per capita 
Agriculture 
Trade, Industry, Energy & Employment 
Transport 
Housing 
Other Environmental Services 
Law, Order & Protective Services 
Education 
National Heritage 
Health & Personal Social Services 
Social Security 
Total 
Source: Scottish Office (1996) 
UK=100 
i 192 
168 
105 
171 
132 
i 105 
126 
132 
122 
108 
120 
England=100 
251 
i 203 
104 
1
 197 
142 
111 
131 
j 129 
! 126 
111 
125 
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